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Abstract 
The current article addresses bystander action to confront disparaging humor as a form of 
moral courage. We ask: When is disparaging humor seen as harmless fun or as a pernicious 
form of prejudice? What are the social and psychological processes through which bystanders 
confront, evade, or collaborate in disparaging humor? Three experiments (Ns = 95, 213, 220), 
involving a novel paradigm (‘the shared media paradigm’) test the role of bystander 
emotional responses (anger/amusement) in shaping action to confront disparagement humor, 
through emotion-based social influence. Study 1 demonstrates that bystander action to 
confront disparagement humor as prejudice is shaped by the angry (but not amused) 
responses of co-present others. Study 2 considers a moderator of the influence process: the 
role of one’s own emotional reaction to disparagement humor (angry/amused). Bystander 
confrontation was more intense when one’s own angry reaction was validated by that of other 
bystanders but there was otherwise mixed evidence that the two interacted to promote 
collaboration/confrontation. Study 3 tests the claim that disparagement humour is especially 
challenging to confront because humor disarms opposition. Intergroup commentary was seen 
as more amusing and confrontation was more strongly resisted when humor was used (vs. a 
non-humorous control remark). Overall, the results show that the reactions of bystanders play 
an important role in shaping what is (or is not) perceived to be prejudice. Courageous action 
to confront the disparagement of members of minority groups is enabled by the emotional 
signals of others who are co-present.  
 
 
Keywords: emotion norms; social influence; disparagement humor; bystander action; 
confrontation; social appraisal; prejudice; collective action.  
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‘That’s Not Funny!’ Standing Up Against Disparaging Humor 
“Everyday” prejudice is all too common. Although legal and social sanctions can 
limit overt or blatant prejudice, members of minority groups report that they continue to 
experience frequent disparaging remarks about their group, with detrimental outcomes for the 
individual (e.g., Mellor, 2003) and society (Elias & Paradies, 2016). One of the most 
common and insidious forms of prejudice is disparaging humor. Disparagement humor 
includes remarks which elicit amusement through the denigration or belittlement of a target 
(Ferguson & Ford, 2004, p. 283). Approximately one in four online comedy videos contain 
some form of anti-gay, sexist, or racist humor (Parrott, 2016). Such humor is typically seen as 
a more ‘acceptable’ form of intergroup commentary because the levity with which the remark 
is delivered suggests that it should not be taken seriously – after all, it is “just a joke” (Ford, 
Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008). However, disparaging humor, even where it trades on 
ostensibly benign stereotypes, is deeply problematic (see Ford, Breeden, O’Connor, & Banos, 
2017; Ferguson & Ford, 2008 for reviews). Such humor reinforces intolerant attitudes and 
derogatory stereotypes (e.g., Ford, 1997) and shifts the normative context to one that supports 
discrimination (Ford et al., 2008; Ferguson & Ford, 2004; Saucier, O’Dea, & Strain, 2016), 
normalizing harm (Strain, Martens, & Saucier, 2016).  
Part of the solution to the insidious effects of disparagement humor may be to 
encourage bystanders (i.e., people who are present when the remark is delivered but not 
targets of the remark) to confront it; that is, to take bystander action (Pedersen, Paradies, 
Hartley, & Dunn, 2011). However, this raises its own challenges. Research shows that the 
most common response to incidents of “everyday” prejudice is to ignore it (e.g., Hyers, 
2010). Even those bystanders who are offended by disparaging humor may remain silent 
because the context itself remains highly ambiguous (Swim & Hyers, 1998). Simply put, the 
remarks are often not interpreted to be prejudice: even when they are highly counter-
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normative, pejorative and unjustified, the social context of the humor makes confrontation 
appear inappropriate (“it was only a joke… where’s your sense of humor?”). 
The current article addresses bystander action to confront disparaging humor as a 
form of moral courage. Moreover, we tackle one of the complexities of moral violations more 
generally: the idea that what “is” and “is not” a moral violation is often subjective, “in the eye 
of the beholder” and, as such, a key site of social influence (see Mikula & Wenzel, 2000; van 
den Bos, 2003). Accordingly, our research addresses two key questions: When is disparaging 
humor seen as harmless fun or as an unacceptable form of prejudice? What are the social and 
psychological processes through which bystanders confront, evade, or collaborate in 
disparaging humor? Our analysis focuses on the role of bystander anger and amusement in 
shaping responses to disparaging humor.  
Bystander action to confront disparagement humor as a group process   
Bystander action to confront everyday prejudice, including disparaging humor, serves 
multiple important social functions: it provides social and emotional support to the targets of 
prejudice, challenges the acceptability of such humor, and reduces the likelihood that it will 
be repeated (Nelson, Paradies, & Dunn, 2011). Bystander action may reduce distress in the 
targets of prejudice but also challenge the false consensus that prejudice is acceptable, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that prejudicial behavior will be repeated (see Pedersen et al., 
2011). Indeed, Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003) demonstrated 
that although confrontation elicits negative affect and cognitions in perpetrators of bias (the 
joke teller), it also promotes feelings of guilt and self-reflection, indirectly reducing their use 
of stereotypes and attenuating prejudice. For Baumert, Halmburger, and Schmitt (2013), 
bystander action to confront prejudice, in spite of the potential for negative consequences for 
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oneself, is a quintessential form of moral courage (see also Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & 
Frey, 2010).  
What are the factors that shape perceptions of disparagement humor? Existing 
research has primarily focused on the role of individual differences in attitudes towards the 
target group and/or prejudice (see Woodzicka & Ford, 2010, for a review in the context of 
sexist humor). For instance, Hodson, Rush, and MacInnis (2010) demonstrated that cavalier 
humor beliefs – beliefs that endorse the characterization of disparagement humor as light-
hearted and not serious – are associated with favourable reactions to jokes that disparage 
outgroups, as well as generalized prejudice and prejudice-correlates such as social dominance 
orientation. Ford et al. (2008) showed that for sexist men (i.e., those high in hostile sexism), 
exposure to sexist humor promoted support for discriminatory resource allocations. Other 
research highlights the challenges to interpersonal relationships posed by “everyday 
prejudice”: confronting prejudice can be costly. Swim and Hyers’ (1998; Hyers, 2010) 
research on interpersonal confrontation, for example, suggests that members of victim groups 
will weigh up the personal costs and benefits of confronting a prejudiced perpetrator. Thus, 
responses to everyday prejudice, such as disparaging humor, have primarily been studied in 
terms of the characteristics of the perceiver that shape recognition (i.e., pre-existing 
prejudiced or socially dominant motives), and/or the interpersonal costs of confrontation.   
We take a different tack to focus on confrontation and collaboration as processes of 
social influence (see Turner, 1991).1 Our starting point is the observation that disparagement 
humor is highly ambiguous in nature and that it is the reactions of others that will therefore 
tell us what is normal, acceptable and “right” (Platow et al., 2005). Just as the impact of a live 
comedy act or stage play is influenced by the laughter, applause, groans and hisses from the 
audience, we propose that responses to everyday ‘performances’ of prejudice are influenced 
in similar ways. Indeed, Condor and colleagues (2006; Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, & 
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Stevenson, 2006) argued that public expressions of prejudice (including, we suggest, 
disparagement humor) constitute ‘collaborative accomplishments’, a product of joint action 
amongst a number of individuals (see also Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016). It follows that 
it is the reactions of other bystanders – those co-present when the disparagement is delivered 
– that will (partly) inform responses to the statement as prejudice promoting angry 
confrontation, or as harmless fun to be affirmed through amusement and enjoyment.  
This confrontation need not occur only in face-to-face situations. Disparagement 
humor online is ubiquitous and, in this digital age, one of the primary ways in which 
stereotypes are encountered, disseminated, reinforced or contested (see Parrott, 2016). In an 
online setting, overt prejudice or hate speech can be reported to administrators. However, 
disparagement humor is covert and subtle, and so we would not expect formal reporting to be 
a common response. Rather, there are other opportunities to express dissent to content 
through such things as comments, (dis)likes and shares. Bystanders might be able to confront 
disparagement online without risk of physical danger (cf., Fischer et al., 2011) but there are 
nevertheless high potential costs in a setting where the effects of confrontation are no longer 
limited to one’s immediate interpersonal network (Crockett, 2017). Malicious trolling, online 
shaming or ‘pile ons’ – mass, anonymous harassment or denigration directed at those who are 
perceived to have transgressed – are also realities of the online environment (Cheung, 2014). 
People who object to disparaging humor can themselves become subjected to online 
victimization and, as such, online confrontation represents an important, everyday form of 
morally courageous action.  
It is important to note that, in an online environment, the written word can connote 
approval or disapproval in a narrow sense, but can itself also be behavioral (reflecting 
confrontation/collaboration). Speech act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) suggests that 
utterances should not be seen as somehow separate from behavior but are, in and of 
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themselves, ways of telling others “how things are”, influencing others, committing oneself, 
expressing values, and bringing about changes in the world (see also Fiedler, 2008). In this 
case, then, ‘disliking’ is indeed disapproval but is also public and carries risks in an online 
setting, where other friends or users in the social network can see that you have indicated 
your disapproval of the content. Similarly, ‘liking’ is merely approval in a narrow sense, but 
in an online environment can also function as de facto collaboration because of how ‘likes’ 
empower an online users’ position. Comments represent written and traceable evidence of 
commitment or antagonism and are, in many ways, more committal than more fleeting and/or 
deniable offline interactions. It is notable also that the targets of such confrontation include 
the creator of the content (the ostensible ‘perpetrator’) but also a potentially large past and 
future audience (some of whom have been, or could become, accomplices to the 
disparagement; Condor, 2006).    
In short, online environments move confrontation from an interpersonal setting to a 
(potentially) global one (see Sawaoka & Monin, 2018). In this way, action to confront 
disparagement humor is both the domain of mundane “everyday” social interaction and at the 
same time requires significant moral courage (Gearhart & Zhang, 2010). On the other hand, 
inaction contributes to the spiral of silence, whereby opinions are not expressed due to a fear 
of social isolation, despite inaction indirectly maintaining opposition as a minority 
perspective (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).  
There is also a methodological benefit to studying disparagement humor and 
confrontation online. Specifically, the online setting allows us to present disparagement 
remarks in a way that imitates exposure in everyday social interaction, overcoming a lack of 
experimental realism that characterizes many empirical tests of the effects of disparagement 
humor (see also Saucier, Strain, Miller, O’Dea & Till, 2018) and bystander action (which has 
tended to rely on self-report or scenarios; e.g., Pedersen et al., 2011).  
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Emotion and emotion communication in bystander responses to disparagement humor 
To understand bystander action against disparaging humor, and the moral courage to 
confront it, our analysis draws on the joint insights of the social identity approach (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) and social appraisal theories of emotion (Manstead & 
Fischer, 2001). These theories allow us to test the role of bystander emotional reactions and 
group-based processes of social influence in shaping perceptions of, and responses to, 
disparagement humor. Disparagement humor that goes unchallenged may well promote a 
normative climate that supports prejudice (e.g., Ford et al., 2008; Hodson et al., 2010), but 
the reverse may also be true: the perceived emotional reactions of other bystanders, those co-
present when the disparaging remarks are delivered, may also shape perceptions of 
disparagement humor itself, either as prejudice or playful levity. This seems especially likely 
given that disparagement humor is inherently ambiguous and, in situations of uncertainty, we 
are likely to look to the reactions to other people to inform our perceptions (Asch, 1955; 
McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993; Sherif, 1935). It is through perceiving and 
interpreting the reactions of others that aspects of social reality comes to be experienced as 
objectively “real and true” (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996). These 
processes of social influence, social validation and co-construction are inherently transmitted 
through social communication and interaction (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009). 
Theoretically, we conceive of this as a process of emotion-based social influence (see 
also Livingstone, Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2016; Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, 
Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). Social appraisal theory recognises 
that the expression of emotion is a powerful form of social communication (Manstead & 
Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 1996; Parkinson, Manstead, & Fischer, 2005; van Kleef, de Dreu, 
& Manstead, 2010). Visible emotional reactions do not just inform us about another person’s 
internal state; they also provide information about their intended actions in relation to a given 
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event, and make claims to others about possible and proper actions in a given situation (see 
Niendenthal & Brauer, 2012). For example, Parkinson (1996) argues that expressing anger 
not only reflects one’s own disapproval of an event, but can also communicate to others that 
this is an event of which they should also disapprove. In this way anger can be instrumental 
in enlisting collective support in resisting the situation of which one disapproves. Conversely, 
the expression of amusement communicates to others that this is a situation of which one 
should approve, reflecting intentions to affiliate with the source of amusement (Hess, Blairy 
& Kleck, 2000). We follow the earlier work of Livingstone et al. (2011; Livingstone et al., 
2016) and Thomas and colleagues (Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009a) to 
suggest that emotions (specifically: anger and amusement), as with cognitions and behavior, 
can act as sources of social influence to shape intergroup processes.  
The social identity account of social influence has also highlighted the prominent role 
of the social frame of reference in shaping these influence processes (who is in one’s ingroup 
vs. the outgroup; Abrams et al., 1990) and bystander intervention specifically (Levine, 
Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine & Crowther, 2008). Platow et al. (2005), for 
example, asked participants to listen to an audio recording of jokes, informing participants 
that the audible (“canned”) laughter was produced by ingroup members (fellow students) or 
outgroup members (members of a political party with whom participants did not identify). 
Data revealed more smiling and laughter, and more favourable humor ratings when 
participants heard ingroup laughter than outgroup laughter or no laughter at all. This suggests 
that people may well be more likely to find disparaging humor funny if ingroup members 
laugh and find it offensive where ingroup members do not. In the present research, we control 
for the effects of the referent group by telling participants that the other bystanders were all 
test users of the site (i.e., people fulfilling the same role as them), creating a nominal ingroup 
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affiliation as a pre-condition of social influence (see also Bourhis, Gadweld, Giles, & Tajfel, 
1977).  
Overview of Studies 
The current research considers reactions to disparaging humor as an outcome of 
(emotion-based) social influence. In three experiments, we test the role of bystander emotion 
(anger/amusement) in shaping bystander actions to confront disparagement humor. Our 
experiments introduce the ‘shared media paradigm’ as a novel method through which to 
examine bystander action as a form of moral courage in online settings. Participants were told 
that they were participating in a study on online humor and that their task was to evaluate 
video clips. They were presented with a series of ‘humorous’ videos (Study 1) or images 
(memes; Studies 2-3) housed on a bogus site and were asked to interact with the webpages as 
they would typically interact with content on social media. One of the clips (the target clip) 
presented a piece of anti-gay disparagement humor: a ‘joke’ that could be dismissed as 
harmless fun, or perceived as perpetuating offensive stereotypes about gay people. 
Specifically, the content drew on stereotypes about gay people as superficial and/or fashion 
obsessed (although we note that any stereotypical portrayal of minority group members has 
been linked with increased negative perceptions of the group as a whole; e.g., Ford, 1997). 
We systematically varied the information conveying the emotional reactions of other 
bystanders (ostensible users of the site); and took behavioral measures of outcome variables 
(‘likes’, ‘star ratings’). The comment on the clip was content analysed for evidence of angry 
confrontation and/or amused collaboration. The paradigm therefore has a strong analogue 
with video sharing website YouTube (Study 1) and Facebook (Studies 2-3).  
Study 1 tests the effects of emotion-based social influence on confrontation of 
disparagement humor, as one socially consequential form of moral courage. We also move 
the literature on disparagement humor beyond a singular focus on amusement, to consider the 
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role of other bystander emotions, in combination with one’s personal anger (Study 2) in 
promoting confrontation (see Woodzicka & Ford, 2010). Finally, although it is recognized 
that disparagement humor may be uniquely able to denigrate its targets whilst stifling 
criticism, it is not yet clear whether this also flows on to undermine bystander confrontation 
(relative to non-humorous forms of intergroup commentary; Study 3).  
Study 1 
Participants were presented with a disparagement video clip and were asked to view 
all the content on the page before leaving their own ratings and comment. The bystander 
response was manipulated either to reflect anger, amusement or, in a control condition, there 
was no bystander response (and participants were led to believe that they were the first to 
review the content). We also took self-reported measures of enjoyment and the perceived 
appropriateness of user comments on the site. We expected that confrontation – evidenced in 
lower ratings, greater ‘dislikes’, and angry commentary – would be greatest where the 
bystander response was socially appraised as angry, relative to both the ‘amused’ and control 
conditions. Conversely, collaboration in the disparagement – evidenced in higher ratings, 
greater ‘likes’, and supportive commentary – would be greatest where the bystander response 
was socially appraised as amused, relative to both the ‘anger’ and control conditions. The 
control condition provided a baseline against which to compare the effects of angry or 
amused bystander responses, respectively.  
Method 
Design and Participants 
Across all three studies, we report all measures and exclusions. Study 1 adopted a 3-
cell between-groups design (no bystander response / angry / amused bystander response) and 
compared the effects on behavioral ratings of the clip (thumbs up/down, star ratings, report 
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button, comment) as well as ratings of the appropriateness of others’ comments and self-
reported enjoyment of the clip. Sample size was determined based on prevailing standards at 
the time that we collected the data of approximately n = 30 per cell. Participants (N = 94) 
were students or other members of the community recruited on the campus of an Australian 
university. They were primarily female (59.6%, 2 participants did not report their gender), 
with an average age of 25.19 (SD = 9.01). On average, participants reported accessing clips 
on YouTube and other social media several times per week. They were reimbursed with $10 
for their time or received partial course credit. A sensitivity analysis using G*power 3.1 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Land, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that this sample size provides 80% power 
to detect an effect as small as p
2 =.096 (f = .325) in the present design (dfnum = 2; groups = 
3). We return to the matter of power in the discussion of study findings.  
Procedure  
Participants attended the laboratory and, having provided consent, were seated in 
front of an iPad. They were told that researchers were conducting market research on a new 
website which has content relating to online humor (‘Random Vids’). Participants were told 
that their task was to view a series of randomly-selected humorous clips, read all the 
comments of other users (described as people who, like them, were also evaluating the site) 
and complete their own ratings and comment. They were not given any information about 
specific future interactions with other users but understood that their comments would be 
there for future participants to read. They were each assigned a gender neutral, personal user 
ID (e.g., Alex19) and logged into the Random Vids site (published on a local implementation 
of WordPress) using the iPads. They then viewed three clips, the second of which represented 
the target stimuli: it was a clip of a North American comedian talking about gay men in ways 
that perpetuated offensive stereotypes (it can be viewed here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TQ04KsHNi8).   
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 We manipulated bystander responses to the clip in several ways (Figure 1 displays the 
user-interface for the ‘angry’ condition). In the angry bystander condition 16 participants had 
given the clip a thumbs down (6 thumbs up); rated the clip 3/10 stars; and a snapshot of the 
‘angry’ comments appeared next to the clip. The user comments on the clip represented an 
angry consensus with 12 comments reflecting anger (e.g., ‘honestly, I found this pretty 
disgraceful’, ‘this makes me ANGRY’), and six indicating a neutral (e.g., ‘hmmmm’) or 
humorous response (e.g., ‘this made me lmao’). Conversely, in the amused condition 16 
participants had rated the clip thumbs up (six thumbs down); rated the clip 7/10 stars; and a 
snapshot of ‘amused’ comments appeared next to the clip. The user comments reflected 
amusement with 12 comments reflecting amusement (e.g., ‘so funny’, ‘I love her facial 
expressions… It makes it so much funnier!’), and six indicating a neutral (e.g., ‘Ok I guess’) 
or angry response (e.g., ‘ANGRY :$’). Many of these comments were adapted from user 
comments that appear on the clip on YouTube. Having viewed the clip and read the other 
user comments (there was no information from other users in the ‘no bystander response’ 
control condition), participants were invited to leave their own ratings (stars, thumbs 
up/down, report the content as offensive) and their own comment. This comment was content 
analysed. Participants then completed the same process with a third clip (Jedi Kittens; which 
also acted as a positive mood induction) and were directed to a secure online server (hosted 
by SurveySelect) to complete an online questionnaire.  
Measures 
In addition to key behavioral measures (star rating, thumbs up/down, report the 
content as offensive, comment), participants completed measures checking their appraisal of 
the other users’ reactions (manipulation checks), as well as measures of their own enjoyment 
of the clip/s and the perceived appropriateness of bystander comments. We also took 
measures of social dominance orientation, anti-gay prejudice, use of humor, and importance 
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of confronting; the results for these latter measures are not described here but can be found in 
a supplementary file. We also took a single-item measure of the degree to which the 
participant identified as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transsexual; this variable is included as a 
covariate in the analyses reported below (its inclusion did not change the pattern of findings). 
Responses were recorded on a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) scale, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Manipulation check. The social appraisal of the other users’ reactions of amusement 
and anger was checked with one item for each emotion: “It seemed like most people found 
the clip funny [outrageous]”. 
Behavioral measure. The comments left by the participants were content analysed by 
two independent coders who coded for the occurrence (1 = occurred, 0 = did not occur) and 
intensity (1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong) of the expression of confrontation (overt 
expressions of discontent, anger) and collaboration (overt expressions of enjoyment, 
amusement), respectively. In these data, an example of the strong (coded 3) occurrence 
(coded 1) of confrontation is: ‘OFFENSIVE !!!’; an example of moderate (coded 2) 
occurrence (coded 1) of confrontation is: ‘She spent the whole time stereotyping gay men. 
She was annoying and it was poorly written’. An example of the strong (coded 3) occurrence 
(coded 1) of collaboration is: ‘Soooooo funny...are you a uniform?’; an example of the 
moderate (coded 2) occurrence (coded 1) of collaboration is: ‘Quite funny, more towards 
sexual jokes. But is pretty good’. 
Enjoyment. Self-reported enjoyment was assessed with two items: “The video was 
easy to watch” and “The video was enjoyable”. The two items were highly correlated, r = .81, 
p < .001, and were averaged to form a scale.  
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Perceived appropriateness of bystander commentary. Two items assessed the 
degree to which the bystander (user) responses were seen as appropriate: “I thought the other 
participants’ comments were appropriate” and “I thought the other participants’ comments 
were tasteless” (reverse-scored). The two items were correlated, r = .53, p < .001, and were 
averaged to form a scale.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analyses 
 A small amount of missing data (less than 5.3% for any variable) was Missing 
Completely at Random, χ2 (6) = 1.81, p = .94 and was addressed using listwise deletion 
within each analysis. To first assess the effectiveness of the bystander manipulation, we 
compared the responses of the two conditions who viewed bystander responses (we did not 
include the control as they did not view other user comments). Results demonstrated that the 
manipulation was successful: participants agreed that the other users had found the clip funny 
to a greater extent in the amusement condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.55) than the anger condition 
(M = 2.03, SD = 1.00), F(1, 56) = 57.52, p < .001, η2p = .51; whilst participants agreed that 
other users had found the clip outrageous to a greater extent in the anger condition (M = 6.37, 
SD = .77) than the amusement condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.16), F(1, 56) = 30.69, p < .001, 
η2p = .35. The relatively high mean for endorsement of angry commentary in the amusement 
condition (M = 5.00) is a point that we return to below.  
Main analyses  
Table 1 displays the frequencies (for categorical variables) and/or means (for 
continuous variables) across the three conditions. Although the thumbs down ratings trended 
in the expected direction, these differences were not significant, χ2(4) = 7.43, p = .12. 
However, binomial tests showed that the proportions of people selecting thumbs down were 
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not different from 50% (chance) in the amused (p = .35) or control conditions (p = .25) but a 
significantly greater proportion of people selected thumbs down in the anger condition (p = 
.004). Moreover, there were differences in the star ratings of the clip, F(2, 85) = 4.88, p = 
.010, η2p = .10. Follow-up contrasts revealed that differences in ratings were driven by 
reductions in the anger condition relative to the amused, t(86) = 2.69, p = .009, d = 0.75, and 
control conditions, t(86) = 2.71, p = .008, d = 0.73.  There were (marginal) differences in the 
occurrence of confrontational commentary, χ2(2) = 5.91, p = .052, reflecting greater 
frequency of confrontational comments in both the anger and amusement conditions 
(compared to the control); there was also greater intensity of confrontation in the angry and 
amused conditions, relative to the control, F(2, 86) = 3.70, p = .04, η2p = .07. Conversely, 
there were no differences in the occurrence, χ2 (2) = 1.31, p = .52, or intensity, F(2, 86) = 
0.58, p = .56, η2p = .01, of collaborative commentary. Only one person reported the content as 
offensive (that person was in the ‘angry’ condition) and, as such, this measure did not yield 
sufficient cases for analysis. There were no differences in self-reported enjoyment, F(2, 85) = 
0.98, p = .38, η2p = .02; however, the commentary of the other users was perceived as more 
appropriate in the anger condition relative to the other conditions, F(2, 85) = 6.84, p = .002, 
η2p = .14. 
This study provides initial support for our key prediction: bystander action to confront 
disparagement humor as prejudice is shaped by the perceived responses of others. When the 
same content was presented with no bystander response or with a normative (humorous) 
response, approximately half of participants rejected the clip; however, when the content was 
presented alongside angry bystander feedback nearly three quarters of participants rejected 
the clip (thumbs down) and overall ratings of the clip were lower.  
The coding of the comments provides a congruent yet slightly different pattern 
whereby there was more frequent occurrence, and greater intensity, of confrontational 
BYSTANDER ACTION TO CONFRONT DISPARAGMENT HUMOR  17 
rejection in both the anger and amusement conditions. The manipulation checks showed that 
participants perceived bystander responses as relatively angry even in the amusement 
condition (M = 5.00, above the scale mid-point). It may be that the small number of angry 
comments (4 of 22) that were presented in this condition produced this effect (a form of 
minority influence, discussed further below; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). That is, 
because the expression of anger runs counter to the broader normative project of a site about 
online humor (where amused or neutral commentary is the norm), these minority expressions 
of anger were still impactful in shaping the views of participants in so far as they suggested 
reduced consensus or even a bimodal distribution of reactions (see Asch, 1956, for a similar 
example of how a dissenting minority can reduce the influence of a majority on individual 
perceivers). By contrast, in the no feedback (control) condition there is ostensibly less reason 
to deviate from the assumption that amusement for such a site is the dominant norm. Viewed 
this way, the amusement condition could also be seen as a ‘weak anger’ condition suggesting 
that even a small minority of bystanders expressing anger at disparagement humor may help 
to promote its rejection.  
It is also the case that our manipulation of bystander response may have been 
compromised by the audible audience reactions in the video clip; the laughter of the audience 
in the clip may have obscured the effects of the manipulation. Finally, the power analysis 
reported above suggests that this initial study may have been under powered to detect effects 
of medium magnitude or smaller, such as those observed on the comment variables. It also 
meant that significant effects in this study were also large, and could possibly represent an 
overestimation of the population effect. For both of these reasons, Study 2 tested our 
hypotheses with a larger sample size. 
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Study 2 
Study 1 demonstrated the important role of (emotion-based) social influence in 
shaping perceptions of disparagement humor as either necessitating confrontation, or 
harmless levity. But what about the role of one’s own emotional reactions to the remarks? 
Prior to perceiving feedback from the social environment about the emotional responses of 
other bystanders (social appraisal), perceivers are also likely to experience their own 
emotional reactions that might also inform their understanding of the situation (e.g., 
Livingstone et al., 2011, 2016; van den Bos, 2003; van Kleef, 2009). Appraisal theories of 
emotion highlight that appraisals, such as the meaning of an event to the self (primary 
appraisal), and coping ability (secondary appraisal), produce specific emotional reactions to 
events and situations (Lazarus, 1991). In turn, emotions such as anger or amusement elicit 
situationally-relevant action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Parkinson, 1996). For example, anger 
arises from appraisals of an event as being inconsistent with one’s own moral framework, and 
with one’s ability to act effectively in response (Lazarus, 1991). This anger, in turn, generates 
action tendencies to confronting the source of the anger (e.g., the person who told an 
inappropriate joke).  
Conversely, amusement is characterised, at least in part, by appraisals that the object 
is consistent with a moral framework, ultimately eliciting more positive emotional responses 
(e.g., smiling and laughter) and has a relationship-building function (e.g., Fraley & Aron, 
2004). Prior research suggests that those high in pre-existing prejudice (hostile and 
ambivalent sexism, Ford et al., 2008; social dominance motive, Hodson et al., 2011) are more 
likely to find disparagement humor amusing. We are unaware of experimental work 
examining feelings of anger about disparagement humor (see Woodzicka & Ford, 2010, who 
note that this is an important but hitherto un-explored direction for future research). 
Nevertheless, because these two emotions (anger and amusement) indicate very different 
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initial reactions to disparagement humor, they should qualify the effects of others’ emotional 
reactions to disparagement humor on confrontation. Put differently, the moral courage to act 
on one’s own reaction may well be enabled by the emotional signals of others in bystander 
situations.   
Study 2 therefore tests the role that one’s own emotion (anger /amusement) plays in 
shaping responses to disparaging humor both directly, and also in combination with 
bystander emotional responses (anger /amusement). We test the idea that when confronted 
with instances of disparaging humor, people use the responses of other bystanders to inform 
their responses of the remarks, but this is qualified by one’s own emotional reaction 
(Livingstone et al., 2011, 2016; van den Bos, 2003). To the extent that the reactions of other 
bystanders (other users of the site and therefore nominal ingroup members) affirm one’s own 
reaction, then that social appraisal should validate and enhance one’s emotional response 
(van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; see also Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 
2009a). However, when one’s own and others’ emotional reactions to disparaging humor 
differ (i.e., own anger, other amusement; own amusement, other anger), then this is likely to 
lead to a re-calibration of one’s own initial emotional response, so that we come to feel 
(respectively) less angry or amused due to the influence of others (Abrams et al., 1990; 
Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Turner, 1991). We therefore expected to observe statistical 
interactions between the individual’s own emotional response (continuous measures of anger 
or amusement) and the responses of bystanders (manipulated anger or amusement) such that 
confrontation is greatest where personal anger and bystander anger match; and collaboration 
in the disparagement ‘project’ is greatest where personal amusement and bystander 
amusement match. Disparities between one’s own and the socially-appraised emotion should 
diminish both confrontation and collaboration, resulting in evasion.  
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Study 2 also addresses two limitations of Study 1. The first is that we removed the 
audience “canned” laughter that was present in the video clip by using memes, or images (see 
Weng, Flammini, Vespignani, & Menczer, 2012). There is little work on the social 
psychology of memes but these represent an important part of the social media landscape and 
are increasingly used to contest unequal intergroup relations (Leach & Allen, 2017). The 
paradigm was therefore adapted to reflect a change to ‘motivational memes/statements’ in 
social media, analogous to interacting with content on Facebook or Twitter. To measure 
individual emotional reactions, participants were presented with a pop-up box asking them to 
rate their emotional reactions before they were exposed to bystander information. The second 
priority was to recruit a larger sample to ensure sufficient power to detect small-to-medium-
sized effects. 
Method 
Design and Participants 
Study 2 extended the three-cell between-groups design (no response / angry / amused 
bystander response) of Study 1 with two continuous moderators (individual amusement and 
anger) on behavioral ratings of the clip (thumbs up/down, report button, comment) as well as 
ratings of the appropriateness of others’ comments and self-reported enjoyment of the clip. 
Participants (N = 220) were North American residents recruited through online 
crowdsourcing site Prolific Academic (https://prolific.ac/). They were primarily male (54.1%; 
3 participants did not report their gender), with an average age of 31.09 (SD = 10.58). 90% of 
participants had a Facebook account, which they reported accessing an average of 10-30 
minutes per day. Sample size was primarily determined by resources available to conduct the 
study, and we sought to maximize the sample size given available resources. A sensitivity 
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analysis using G*power 3.1 indicated that this sample size provides 80% power to detect an 
effect as small as p
2 =.04 (f = .21) in the present design (largest dfnum = 2).   
Procedure  
The procedure and set-up were similar to that described in Study 1, but participants 
were exposed to images (memes) instead of videos. The website and cover story were 
adapted to reflect an ostensible interest in understanding motivational content on social media 
and participants were told that they would be randomly presented with five motivational 
statements (memes) from a database of over 600 statements. Participants read that the 
statements would be similar to those that they would encounter on social media, where some 
would be “philosophical statements about life, others are observations about aspects of social 
life”.  The site was called ‘motivational memes’ and was implemented in a custom built 
Wordpress site. Participants were presented with five memes, the fourth of which represented 
the target disparaging humor stimuli. Specifically, the target meme featured an image of a 
man speaking to an audience with the captions: “Everyone’s always saying how well gay 
men dress. I guess they didn’t spend all that time in the closet doing nothing”. The target 
stimuli therefore reflected the disparaging stereotypes that gay men hide their sexuality and 
are vain, excessively interested in outward appearances.  
After participants had viewed each meme, a pop-up box would appear and 
participants were asked to quickly rate the content on how: amused, inspired, outraged, 
entertained, and angry it made them feel. ‘Inspired’ was a filler item (to maintain the cover 
story regarding motivational content); amused and entertained, r = .77, p < .001, and outraged 
and angry, r = .79, p < .001, were strongly correlated and these items were averaged to form 
measured responses of own amusement and anger, respectively.  
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Having completed the ratings, participants were then presented with the information 
about other users of the site (ostensible ‘bystanders’). As in Study 1, the content around the 
meme was systematically varied to reflect bystander reactions. In the angry bystander 
condition, participants saw that only eight people (of 42 votes) had liked (thumbs up) the 
meme, and the comments reflected a majority anger response (12 of 18 comments; three 
amused, three neutral). In the amused bystander condition, participants saw that 36 people 
had liked the meme (of 42 votes), and the comments reflected a majority amused response 
(12 of 18; three angry, three neutral). We retained the small proportion of people who 
presented an opposing view (i.e., three angry in the amused condition; three amused in the 
angry condition) because doing so provides a more conservative test of hypotheses, with 
greater realism (most online environments do not present a completely unanimous view). In 
the no response control condition, participants saw that no people had liked the meme 
because no one had viewed it yet and there were no comments. Participants were instructed to 
complete their rating (thumbs up/down) and leave a comment. Once they had completed 
these tasks for all five memes, participants were directed to a secure online server (hosted by 
Qualtrics) to complete an online questionnaire. 
As in Study 1, in addition to key behavioral measures (thumbs up/down and 
comment), we took measures of the social appraisal (which serve as manipulation checks, r = 
.73, p <.001 for angry, r = .93, p < .001 for amused), self-reported enjoyment, r = .87, p < 
.001, and the appropriateness of bystander comments, r = .50, p < .001. The measurement 
approach was identical to Study 1 but was adapted to refer to the memes instead of videos. 
The comments left by the participants were again content analysed by two independent 
coders who coded for the occurrence (1 = occurred, 0 = did not occur) and intensity (1 = 
mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong) of the expression of confrontation (overt expressions of 
discontent, anger) and collaboration (overt expressions of enjoyment, amusement), 
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respectively. Inter-rater reliability was acceptable, κ = .43-.92, p <.001. In these data, an 
example of the strong (coded 3) occurrence (coded 1) of confrontation is: ‘This is actually 
offensive. Gay men can do as they please’; an example of moderate (coded 2) occurrence 
(coded 1) of confrontation is: ‘Not funny, demeaning’. An example of the strong (coded 3) 
occurrence (coded 1) of collaboration is: ‘Hilarious!’; an example of the moderate (coded 2) 
occurrence (coded 1) of collaboration is: ‘Hah, got a chuckle, so thumbs up’. An item 
assessing the degree to which the participant identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
transsexual (LGBT) was again included as a covariate in the analyses reported below. As in 
Study 1, we included several supplementary variables – the results for these are available in 
the supplementary file. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analyses 
 There were some missing data on the behavioral variables (between 3-9%) and self-
report variables (~1%); this data was Missing Completely at Random, χ2 (64) = 67.90, p = .35 
and was addressed using listwise deletion within each analysis. We again assessed the effects 
of the bystander manipulation by comparing the responses of the two conditions who viewed 
bystander responses (we did not include the control as they did not view other user 
comments). The manipulation was successful: participants agreed that the other users had 
found the clip funny to a greater extent in the amusement condition (M = 4.79, SD = 1.39) 
than the anger condition (M = 2.14, SD = 1.18), F (1, 140) = 140.56, p < .001, η2p = .50. 
Participants also agreed that other users had found the clip outrageous to a greater extent in 
the anger condition (M = 5.67, SD = 1.08) than the amusement condition (M = 3.39, SD = 
1.40), F(1, 141) =116.61, p < .001, η2p = .45. We conclude that the manipulation was 
successful.  
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Main Analyses  
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics (proportions, mean and standard deviation) 
for the key variables by manipulated experimental condition. To provide an overview of 
effects that may be of interest to readers beyond the scope of our hypotheses, the sub-scripts 
denote where there were differences between conditions (p < .05 obtained via Analysis of 
Variance with pairwise comparisons). It can be seen that there were significant overall 
differences between conditions such that the angry bystander response reduced the 
occurrence and intensity of collaboration, as well as ‘thumbs down’ ratings. Bystander 
commentary was seen as less appropriate in the angry condition. Unlike Study 1 (see Table 
1), confrontational comments occurred relatively infrequently overall (in ~13% of cases). 
Although the differences between conditions were not significant, it is notable that there were 
twice as many confrontational comments in the angry bystander condition than there were in 
either of the other two conditions.  
We used Hayes (2019) PROCESS tool v3.3 (Model 2) with 5000 bias-corrected 
bootstrap samples to test the hypotheses about the effect of bystander responses (manipulated 
independent variable) and one’s own emotional reactions (two continuous, centred, 
moderator variables: own anger and amusement) on responses to disparaging humor (ratings, 
confrontational or collaborative commentary, self-reported enjoyment, and perceived 
appropriateness of bystander reactions). Given that the manipulated independent variable had 
three levels we used the multi-categorical tool to conduct two comparisons for each outcome 
variable. Effect code 1 tested the effect of an angry bystander response (coded 1) relative to 
no bystander response (control condition; coded -1). Effect code 2 tested the effect of an 
angry bystander response (coded 1) relative to an amused bystander response (coded -1). 2 
The supplementary file contains the results comparing the effect of an amused bystander 
response (coded 1) relative to no response (coded -1). Moderators were centred and examined 
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at +/- one standard deviation from the mean; simple slopes for one moderator were examined 
at the average level of the other moderator. LGBT identification was included as a covariate; 
its inclusion did not alter any of the findings. We conducted regression for continuous 
variables (intensity of comment; enjoyment and appropriateness) and logistic regression for 
the categorical variables (thumbs down; occurrence of comment); differences in the reporting 
below reflect the two forms of analysis. Table 3 displays the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (standard error in brackets, 95% confidence interval in square brackets) and 
significance level for the direct effects and interaction terms. No one ‘reported’ the content as 
offensive.   
Thumbs up/down. Table 3 shows that participants were more likely to rate the 
disparagement clip with a thumbs down when they were low in amusement, and also when 
assigned to the angry bystander condition (relative to the amused condition). There was no 
direct effect of angry bystanders relative to the control (effect code 1) but there was a 
significant interaction between effect code 1 and own anger (p = .04) such that the bystander 
manipulation did not affect ratings when anger was low, b = -0.53, p = .32, 95% CI [-0.51, 
1.57], or average, b = 0.19, p = .61, 95% CI [-0.91, 0.54]. Unexpectedly, however, exposure 
to bystander anger was associated with greater ‘thumbs up’ ratings when personal anger was 
high, b = 1.07, p = .046, 95% CI [0.02, 2.13]. Figure 2 displays the interaction.  
Confrontational commentary. Table 3 shows that participants were more likely to 
make a confrontational comment, and with greater intensity, when their initial response was 
angry (effect of own anger) and less likely to do so when they found it amusing (effect of 
own amusement). The combination of one’s own reaction and those of bystanders influenced 
the intensity of confrontation (i.e., an interaction between effect code 2 and own anger; see 
Table 3, Figure 3a). When participants were angry (1 standard deviation above the mean) and 
were exposed to the anger of others (relative to the amusement of others; effect code 2), the 
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intensity of the confrontation was greater, b = 0.28, p = .001, 95%CI [0.11, 0.44]. When 
participants’ own anger was low, b = -0.09, p = .22, 95%CI [-0.23, 0.05], or average, b = -
0.07, p = .18, 95%CI [-0.03, 0.18], bystander responses did not affect the intensity of the 
confrontational comment (Figure 3a).3 A second interaction between effect code 1 and own 
amusement suggested that, when participants were unamused (low) and there was no 
bystander response (relative to an angry response; effect code 1), the intensity of the 
confrontation was greater, b = -0.22, p = .007, 95%CI [-0.38, -0.06]. Conversely, when 
participants were highly amused and exposed to an angry bystander response the intensity of 
confrontation increased, b = 0.18, p = .03, 95%CI [0.02, 0.33]. See Figure 3b. The 
manipulation did not affect intensity of confrontation when participants’ own amusement was 
at the average, b = -0.02, p = .69, 95%CI [-0.13, 0.08].  
The occurrence of confrontation was also explained by an interaction between effect 
code 1 (anger v control conditions) and own amusement (p = .03). None of the simple slopes 
were significant, however: the manipulation did not appear to affect confrontation at low, b = 
-0.49, p = .29, 95%CI [-1.39, 0.42], average levels of amusement, b = 0.36, p = .46, 95%CI [-
0.60, 1.32], or at high levels of amusement, b = 1.21, p = .11, 95% CI [-0.28, 2.70]. 
Collaborative commentary. Participants collaborated in the disparagement when 
they reported the meme as amusing (effect of own amusement) and were less likely to do so 
when they reported that the meme was enraging (effect of own anger; Table 3). There was no 
direct effect of the bystander manipulation; however the effects of the manipulation  on 
collaboration were qualified by one’s own anger (i.e., an interaction between effect code 2 
and anger; p = .048). For those who reported high levels of anger, an angry bystander 
response (relative to an amused response) was associated with significant reductions in 
collaborative commentary, b = -1.13, p = .008, 95%CI [-1.97, -0.29]. When anger was at 
average, b = -0.49, p = .08, 95%CI [-1.03, 0.06], or low levels, b = 0.02, p =.95, 95% CI [-
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0.72, 0.77] bystander responses did not affect the likelihood of collaboration. Figure 4 
displays the interaction.  
Self-reported enjoyment. Explicit enjoyment followed a related pattern to 
collaborative commentary: enjoyment was positively predicted by own amusement and 
negatively predicted by own anger (Table 3). There was also evidence that self-reported 
enjoyment was shaped by the combination of one’s initial level of amusement and the 
bystander response (i.e., an interaction between effect 1 and own amusement; p = .02). Angry 
bystander commentary (relative to the control condition, effect 1) was (marginally) associated 
with increases in self-reported enjoyment only when levels of amusement were high, b = 
0.36, p = .08 , 95%CI [-0.05, 0.77], but not when levels of amusement were low, b = -0.30, p 
= .16, 95%CI [-0.71, 0.12] or average, b = 0.03,  p = .82, 95%CI [-0.24, 0.31]. A figure 
depicting the interaction is available in the supplementary file.  
Appropriateness of bystander reactions. Finally, an amused bystander response 
was seen as more appropriate (relative to an angry response, effect code 2; Table 3) but this 
effect was qualified by an interaction between the manipulation (effect code 2) and measured 
amusement (i.e., an interaction between effect 2 and own amusement; p = .03). There were no 
differences in the perceived appropriateness of bystander responses when amusement was 
low, b = -0.01, p = .93, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.30], but angry responses were seen as less 
appropriate (relative to amused responses, effect code 2) when the participants found the clip 
amusing on average, b = -0.27, p = .02, 95% CI [-0.49, -0.05], and were highly amused, b = -
0.52, p = .001, 95% CI [-0.84, -0.21]. A figure depicting the interaction is available in the 
supplementary file. 
Summary. Overall, the results suggest that bystander reactions shaped how people 
responded to disparaging humor (see Table 2), as did self-reported own anger and amusement 
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(Table 3, main effects of anger and amusement). However, the findings provide mixed 
support for our hypotheses about the interactive effects of own and bystander reactions. We 
expected that confrontation would be greatest where there was a match between one’s own 
anger and the anger of bystanders (i.e., two-way interactions between own anger and effect 
codes 1 and 2). Table 3 shows that this was supported in the context of the intensity of 
confrontation, such that when participants were angry and were exposed to the anger of 
others (but only relative to the amusement of others, effect code 2), the intensity of 
confrontation was greater (Figure 3a). It was also the case that for those who reported high 
levels of anger, an angry bystander response (relative to an amused response) was associated 
with significant reductions in collaboration (Figure 4). However, this pattern was not evident 
in the other analyses, suggesting that the interactive effects of one’s own and bystander anger 
affect the intensity of the response (but not its occurrence per se); and are only expressed in 
comparison to the active collaboration of other bystanders.  
In the context of collaboration, the matching hypothesis was not supported and none 
of the interactions between one’s own amusement and the amusement of bystanders was 
significant. Although unexpected, this latter finding is consistent with other analyses of 
emotion-based social influence: Livingstone et al., (2011, Study 1) observed increased 
willingness to challenge injustice only when there was shared anger (which has clear, action-
associated tendencies in response to illegitimate behaviour; Frijda, 1986), but not shared 
happiness (which has less clear implications for mobilizing group action). Because the 
broader project (and normative climate) of shared media sites is to entertain and amuse, it 
may be that bystander amusement is not required to license collaboration, especially for those 
who are already highly amused. More broadly, the findings suggest that in addition to 
whether our own and others’ emotional reactions to disparaging humor ‘match’ per se, the 
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specific content of those emotional reactions matters too when it comes to understanding 
resistance to such humor. 
There were several other unexpected, counterintuitive results that suggest that the 
social psychological processes at play are highly complex. One of the observed effects 
appears to run counter to the effects described above: specifically, participants were more 
likely to rate the clip with a ‘thumbs up’ if they were angry and so were other bystanders 
(Figure 2). One speculative explanation for this pattern is that people in this condition were 
not endorsing the clip, so much as the angry response of other bystanders (in the same way 
that Facebook and YouTube allow the user to like specific comments on contentious content). 
Moreover, the interaction in Figure 3b suggests that an angry bystander response increased 
confrontation amongst those who were highly amused (consistent with theorizing above); at 
the same time as it undermined confrontation for those low in amusement. This latter effect 
may also indicate a form of a diffusion of responsibility whereby those low in amusement 
(but not high in anger per se) were content to let angry others do the work of confrontation 
(Ling et al., 2005).      
Finally, and perhaps attesting to a persistent online conflict between those who enjoy 
or condone such humor, and those who ostensibly oppose it, there was also evidence that 
people who were highly amused and exposed to bystander anger actively increased their self-
reported enjoyment (Table 3; Figure S1). Thus, for those who are amused at the outset, a 
disparaging clip is even funnier if it makes other people angry – akin to the aggravating 
pleasures of trolling (see Coles & West, 2016).  
Although several of the interactions were non-significant, it is also worth noting that 
the high mundane realism of the procedure and the high-threshold nature of the behavioral 
dependent variables are relatively rare in a controlled, experimental study such as this. It is 
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therefore perhaps not surprising that the effect sizes are not large or consistent across all 
dependent variables. Future research will need to disaggregate multiple, competing social 
psychological processes around (emotion-based) social influence (Livingstone et al., 2011), 
leadership (especially in the absence of a response), bystander diffusion of responsibility 
(especially in the presence of a strong response; Ling et al., 2005), and trolling (i.e., pleasure 
experienced by virtue of aggravating other people).  
One further limitation here is that we tested the effects of own anger and amusement 
as measured variables rather than manipulated variables. It is notoriously difficult to 
manipulate emotions (van den Bos, 2003) and especially fraught in cases like this where we 
sought to maintain realism in the paradigm. The findings here should therefore be considered 
in light of the methodological limitations that correlational analyses entail. In the interests of 
transparency, we report in the supplementary materials an additional study that reports an 
unsuccessful attempt to manipulate individual emotion using the bogus pipeline procedure 
(Jones & Sigall, 1971). 
Study 3 
The final study tested the effects of emotion-based social influence on the 
confrontation of prejudice in the context of disparaging humor versus an equivalent, non-
humorous disparaging remark. In addition to the importance of bystander emotion-based 
social influence (Study 1 and 2), and one’s own emotional reactions (Study 2) in shaping 
confrontation of disparagement humor, we have claimed that there is something particularly 
insidious about disparaging humor, beyond other instances of more overt “everyday 
prejudice” (see also Ferguson & Ford, 2004; Saucier, O’Dea & Strain, 2016). Humor implies 
levity – that the remark is not to be taken seriously – but it is also an affiliative emotion, one 
that functions to build relationships (see e.g., Thomae & Pina, 2015, in the context of sexist 
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humor). It follows that confrontation of disparagement humor may require greater moral 
courage than confrontation of more explicit forms of prejudice. If this is the case, the 
bystander response may be relatively more important in allowing disparagement humor to be 
interpreted as prejudice necessitating confrontation, relative to a non-humorous statement.  
On the other hand, given the relational challenges of confronting prejudice generally 
(e.g., Czopp et al., 2006; Hyers, 2010; c.f., Mallett & Wagner, 2011), it is possible that 
appraising social support for confrontation is equally important in inspiring action for both 
forms of “everyday prejudice” (van Zomeren et al., 2004). To test the relative importance of 
emotion-based social influence in the context of disparagement humor and non-humor, we 
decomposed the stereotypes of a “joke” into statement form and assessed how bystander 
reactions (of anger/amusement) interact to promote confrontation, collaboration, or evasion. 
We test whether the emotion-based social influence process is more important in eliciting the 
courage to confront disparagement humor (relative to an equivalent disparaging remark); or 
whether the bystander response is equally important in shaping action in both cases.  
Method 
Design and participants 
Study 3 had a 3 (bystander response: no response / angry / amused) X 2 (prejudice:  
humor / non-humor) between-groups design, and dependent variables included behavioral 
ratings of the clip (thumbs up/down, comment) as well as ratings of the appropriateness of 
others’ comments and self-reported enjoyment of the clip. Participants (N = 213) were North 
American residents recruited through online crowdsourcing site Prolific Academic 
(https://prolific.ac/). They were primarily female (60.1%, 9 participants did not report their 
gender), with an average age of 35.93 (SD = 12.63). Most (81.7%) participants had a 
Facebook account, which they reported accessing an average of 10-30 minutes per day. 
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Sample size was primarily determined by resources available to conduct the study, and 
sample size was maximized given available resources. A sensitivity analysis using G*power 
3.1 indicated that this sample size provides 80% power to detect an effect as small as p
2 
=.044 (f = .214) in the present design (largest dfnum = 2); a smaller effect size than most of the 
relevant effects observed in Studies 1 and 2.  
Procedure  
The procedure and set-up were similar to that described in Study 2. Participants were 
presented with five memes, the fourth of which represented the target stimuli. As in Study 2, 
in the humor condition, the target meme featured an image of a man speaking to an audience 
with the captions: “Everyone’s always saying how well gay men dress. I guess they didn’t 
spend all that time in the closet doing nothing”. In the statement condition, the target meme 
featured the same image but the caption read: “Gay men hide their sexuality for many years. 
Why are they so obsessed with fashion?” The statement thus decomposed the two key 
stereotypical “claims” of the humor clip into a non-humorous form. Unlike Study 2, where 
participants were presented with a pop-up rating box, participants were able to view the 
meme as well as the information about other users of the site simultaneously (as in Study 1). 
The content around the meme was systematically varied to reflect bystander reactions, 
identical to Study 2 and participants were instructed to complete their rating (thumbs 
up/down) and leave a comment. Once they had completed these tasks for all five memes, 
participants were directed to a secure online server (hosted by Qualtrics) to complete an 
online questionnaire. 
As in Studies 1 and 2, in addition to key behavioral measures (thumbs up/down and 
comment), we took measures of the social appraisal (which serve as manipulation checks, r = 
.73, p < .001 for angry, r = .93, p <.001 for amused), self-reported enjoyment, r = .87, p < 
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.001, and the appropriateness of bystander comments, r = .50, p <.001. As in Studies 1-2, the 
comments left by the participants were content analysed by two independent coders who 
coded for the occurrence (1 = occurred, 0 = did not occur) and intensity (1 = mild, 2 = 
moderate, 3 = strong) of the expression of confrontation (overt expressions of discontent, 
anger) and collaboration (overt expressions of enjoyment, amusement). Inter-rater reliability 
was acceptable, κ = .57-.83, p <.001. In these data, an example of the strong (coded 3) 
occurrence (coded 1) of confrontation is: ‘I don’t get offended easily but this was pretty bad’; 
an example of moderate (coded 2) occurrence (coded 1) of confrontation is: ‘Casual 
homophobia doesn’t really fly anymore. Not funny’. An example of the strong (coded 3) 
occurrence (coded 1) of collaboration is: ‘Don’t be oversensitive. It’s a good joke’; an 
example of the moderate (coded 2) occurrence (coded 1) of collaboration is: ‘This is a solid 
pun’. An item assessing the degree to which the participant identified as LGBT was again 
included as a covariate in the analyses. As in Studies 1-2, we included several supplementary 
variables; the results for these are available in the supplementary file. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the online method of data collection, there were some 
missing data (no more than 5.6% for any variable); this data was Missing Completely at 
Random, χ2 (77) = 61.94, p = .89 and was addressed using listwise deletion within each 
analysis. We again assessed the effects of the bystander manipulation by comparing the 
responses of the conditions who viewed bystander responses (we did not include the control 
as they did not view other user comments) using a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA. The manipulation 
was successful: participants agreed that the other users had found the clip funny to a greater 
extent in the amusement condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.50) than the anger condition (M = 2.44, 
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SD = 1.61), F(1, 127) = 72.36, p < .001, η2p = .36; the effect of the clip (humor/non-humor) 
was not significant, p = .28, and nor was the interaction between the two variables, p = .79. 
Participants also agreed that other users had found the clip outrageous to a greater extent in 
the anger condition (M = 5.32, SD = 1.52) than the amusement condition (M = 3.56, SD = 
1.43), F(1, 125) = 43.18, p < .001, η2p = .26; the effect of the clip (humor/non-humor) was not 
significant, p = .93, and nor was the interaction term, p = .78. As in Studies 1-2, the 
manipulation was successful. 
Main Analyses  
Table 4 displays the means (standard deviations) or proportions for the six 
experimental conditions. It can be seen that the clip was ‘liked’ more when it was presented 
in humor format and there was greater occurrence and intensity of collaborative commentary 
in the humor format. Consistent with the pattern of effects identified in Study 2, there was a 
low incidence of confrontational commentary (~9% of overall comments) but confrontational 
comments occurred more often, and with greater intensity, in the angry bystander conditions.   
Given that our outcome variables are composed of a combination of continuous and 
categorical variables, we used Hayes (2012) PROCESS tool (Model 1) with 5000 bias 
corrected bootstrap samples to test the hypotheses about the effect of bystander responses 
(manipulated independent variable) and the format of the clip (manipulated moderator 
variable: effect coded 1 = humor, -1 = non-humor) on behavioral indicators of collaboration 
and confrontation, self-reported enjoyment, and the perceived appropriateness of other 
bystander comments. We conducted regression for continuous variables (intensity of 
comment; enjoyment and appropriateness) and logistic regression for the categorical 
variables (thumbs down; occurrence of comment). Moreover, in order to disaggregate the 
effects within the bystander condition (i.e., beyond the main effects displayed in Table 4) and 
BYSTANDER ACTION TO CONFRONT DISPARAGMENT HUMOR  35 
test the unique effects of each set of comparisons we again used the multi-categorical tool to 
conduct two comparisons for each outcome variable. Effect code 1 tested the effect of an 
angry bystander response (coded 1) relative to no bystander response (control condition; 
coded -1). Effect code 2 tested the effect of an angry bystander response (coded 1) relative to 
an amused bystander response (coded -1). The supplementary file contains the results of a 
comparison of the effect of an amused bystander response (coded 1) relative to no response 
(coded -1). LGBT identification was included as a covariate; its inclusion did not alter any of 
the findings. Table 5 displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (standard error in 
brackets, 95% confidence interval in square brackets) for the direct effects and interaction 
terms.  
Thumbs up/down. Table 5 shows that the two manipulations affected whether the 
clip was ‘liked’ or not (thumbs down). Specifically, participants were more likely to reject the 
clip when an angry response was presented (relative to an amused response; effect code 2) 
but there were no differences between the anger and control conditions. The presentation of 
the clip in non-humorous form was associated with significantly lower endorsement (thumbs 
down), relative to presentation of the clip in a humorous format (an effect of presentation of 
the clip).   
Confrontational commentary. An angry bystander response (relative to an amused 
one; effect code 2) had a marginal unique effect (p = .06) on the intensity of confrontational 
commentary. There was also some evidence that the presentation of the remark in humor 
form was associated with greater occurrence of confrontation, though this effect was 
marginal (p = .08).  
Collaborative commentary. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, participants were more 
likely to collaborate in the amusement, and with greater intensity, when an amused bystander 
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response was present (relative to an angry response; effect code 2), but also when the remark 
was presented in humor form (effect of presentation; Table 5). The interaction between effect 
2 and the presentation of the clip (marginally) explained the intensity of the collaborative 
comment (p = .08). Figure 5 displays the interaction. Simple slopes confirmed that when the 
clip was in non-humor form the bystander response did not affect intensity of amused 
collaboration, b = -0.09, p = .48, 95%CI [-0.35, 0.16] but when the clip was presented in 
humorous form, the angry bystander response (relative to an amused bystander response, 
effect code 2) was associated with weaker collaboration, b = -0.40, p = .002, 95% CI [-0.65, -
0.16].  
Self-reported enjoyment. Participants reported that they enjoyed the clip more when 
it was in humor form than when it was a non-humorous statement. Participants in the angry 
bystander condition reported greater enjoyment than the control condition (effect 1), but less 
enjoyment than the amused condition (effect 2; Table 5). 
Appropriateness of bystander reactions. Table 5 shows that there was also a 
significant interaction between effect code 2 and presentation of the clip  on the perceived 
appropriateness of the bystander comments (p = .04). However, the simple slopes were not 
significant when a non-humorous clip was presented, b = 0.22, p = .16, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.54] 
or when a humorous clip was presented, b = -0.25, p = .11, 95% CI [-0.55, 0.06].  
Summary. Study 3 provides support for the claims about the uniquely insidious role 
of disparagement humor, with some caveats. Participants found the clip more enjoyable, and 
rated it ‘thumbs up’ more frequently, when it was presented in joke form: since prejudice is 
no laughing matter, this suggests that disparagement humor is less likely to be recognized as 
a form of marginalizing intergroup commentary, relative to a non-humorous equivalent. 
There was also evidence that the perceived appropriateness of bystander commentary is 
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conditioned upon whether they are responding to a joke or a statement, but the direction of 
this effect was difficult to interpret because the simple slopes were non-significant. Contrary 
to our expectation that social support may be especially important in the ambiguous context 
of disparagement humor, an angry bystander response was equally impactful in promoting 
confrontational commentary for both forms of disparaging remark. However, angry bystander 
responding did mitigate the intensity of the collaborative commentary when disparaging 
humor was presented (but not in the context of non-humorous remarks; Figure 5). This 
finding was again identified only in the context of the comparison between the anger and 
amusement conditions (and not in the context of anger and a no response control), suggesting 
that, in these data, it is the active presence of amused commentary (relative to anger) that 
licenses collaboration (Platow et al., 2005). 
General Discussion 
The current research addresses the social and psychological antecedents of bystander 
action to confront disparagement humor as a quintessential form of “everyday” moral 
courage (Baumert et al., 2013). Consistent with observations about bystander intervention 
and helping more generally (Latane & Darley, 1968; see also Fischer et al., 2011), people 
must first perceive disparagement remarks as prejudice in order to intervene, but this is not 
straightforward. Much of the existing literature pre-supposes that prejudice exists 
independent of social context: it either “is” or “is not” prejudice (see Mikula & Wenzel, 
2000; Platow et al., 2019; van den Bos, 2003, for similar critiques).  However, disparaging 
humor is about managing, preserving, and challenging relationships between groups (Hodson 
et al., 2010; also Billig, 2005). It follows that, in addition to individual differences 
(Woodzicka & Ford, 2010) and interpersonal factors (Hyers, 2010), we need to understand 
the social processes through which people come to respond to a given interaction or remark 
as disparagement necessitating redress, rather than playful levity (Condor, 2006; Condor et 
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al., 2006; see also Durrheim et al., 2016). Building on the insights of the social identity 
approach and social appraisal theories of emotion, we tested the hypothesis that people will 
develop the moral courage to confront disparagement humor when the angry responses of 
other bystanders indicate a majority perception of the remarks as prejudicial in nature. 
Three studies broadly support this hypothesis, tested in the context of online 
confrontation and involving a novel ‘shared media’ experimental paradigm which recorded 
behavioral measures of confrontation versus collaboration. Study 1 showed that the same clip 
can be viewed in very different ways depending on the reactions of other bystanders. When 
those co-present were perceived to be enraged by the clip, participants rated the clip lower 
and gave it more ‘thumbs down’, relative to a condition in which there was no bystander 
information provided, or the bystanders were amused. There was greater prevalence and 
intensity of confrontational commentary when the bystanders were angry and amused 
(relative to no-bystander information), the latter effect likely due to the presence of a small 
but distinct minority who reported finding the content enraging (discussed further below).  
Studies 2 and 3 provide evidence of the boundary conditions of the effects of social 
appraisal and social influence on bystander confrontation, but with some twists. Study 2 
showed that one’s own emotional responses (anger, amusement; van den Bos, 2003) as well 
as those of bystanders (anger, amusement, no response), independently shape responses to 
disparaging humor. Study 2 also provided mixed support for the idea that confrontation and 
collaboration are driven by an interaction (fit or match) between the one’s own response and 
those of others. On the one hand, participants who were angry and had their anger validated 
by bystanders recorded a more intense confrontation, as well as reduced occurrence of 
collaboration. On the other hand, the validating effect of a ‘fit’ between one’s own anger and 
others’ anger appeared to be limited to intensity of confrontation and occurrence of 
collaboration, in the context of a comparison between angry and amused bystanders. 
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Moreover, we did not  observe a validation effect on collaboration associated with a fit 
between one’s own amusement and those of bystanders. It may be that in this context, shared 
amusement does not necessarily invoke the need for active collaboration in the same way that 
shared anger may implicate the need for confrontation (consistent also with Livingstone et 
al., 2011). Study 2 also suggested a role for other social psychological processes in 
understanding complex reactions to disparaging humor (detailed in the summary of that 
study). 
Finally, Study 3 tested whether the effects of emotion-based social influence were 
greater in the context of disparagement humor, relative to an equivalent non-humorous 
remark. The findings showed that disparagement humor was more enjoyable, ‘liked’ and 
collaborated in via comment, relative to a non-humor equivalent, confirming suggestions that 
disparagement humor can uniquely denigrate a target whilst stifling criticism (Ferguson & 
Ford, 2004). Although an angry bystander response appeared to mitigate some of the 
intensity of the collusion with disparagement humor, angry bystander responses promoted 
confrontation across both forms of disparagement remark, attesting to the important role of 
social support in promoting action to challenge injustice (van Zomeren et al., 2004; Thomas, 
et al., 2009a).  
In this digital age, online interaction is one of the primary means through which 
stereotypes about groups are disseminated, perpetuated, and/or contested. Shifman and 
Thelwall (2009), for instance, demonstrated how one meme (a joke about men, women, and 
computers) was extensively circulated, evolving to incorporate small, local adaptations.  
Inaction may contribute to a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), allowing those who 
denigrate or subjugate members of minority groups to go unchallenged (see Geaerhart & 
Zhang, 2014, for a discussion in the context of anti-gay prejudice). Worse still, active 
collaboration (by ‘sharing’, ‘liking’, and commentary that endorses the humor) may serve to 
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validate and reinforce stereotypes – fostering group cohesion whilst indirectly fostering 
hostility towards minority group members (e.g., Ford, 1997; Thomae & Pina, 2015). 
Confronting disparaging remarks (even, if not especially, when humorous) can be personally 
costly and requires significant moral courage (Hyers, 2010). However, hitherto, studies of 
disparagement humor have not considered the role of other bystanders, co-present, in shaping 
responses to the humor project. Nor has that literature considered online environments, or the 
role of individual emotions beyond amusement in shaping responses to disparagement humor 
(Study 2; Woodzicka & Ford, 2010). We consider in detail below the implications of having 
done so.  
Bystander action to confront disparaging humor at the intersection of moral courage, 
prejudice reduction, and collective action 
Theoretically, bystander action to confront prejudice represents the intersection 
between literatures on moral courage, prejudice reduction, and collective action. Prejudice 
reduction and collective action represent two frameworks for approaching social justice and 
equality that have, until relatively recently, tended to be considered separately (Wright & 
Baray, 2012). The literature on moral courage has evolved separately altogether, and moral 
courage has been differentiated from helping and other forms of pro-social behavior but not 
compared to collective action or activism per se (Greitemeyer, Fischer, Kastenmüller, & 
Frey, 2006; Osswald et al., 2010). It is therefore worth considering how these findings 
articulate across the three broad traditions.  
Moral courage is traditionally defined as “brave behavior accompanied by anger and 
indignation, which intends to enforce societal and ethical norms without considering one’s 
own social costs” (Osswald et al., 2010, p.150). The current paradigm fits with this definition 
in providing a situation in which there is an imbalance of power: a direct perpetrator and a 
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group of victims, but also a number of bystanders (in this case, other potential confronters or 
enablers) who comprise a third party or audience. However, our approach also differs from 
other treatments of moral courage by considering intervention in contexts where the harm is 
not overt and the societal norms about the expression of such humor are contested (Condor, 
2006; cf. Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek, & Frey, 2006). Our focus on online confrontation 
means that the inferred ‘costs’ are not in terms of immediate physical safety but can instead 
by counted as potentially enduring effects on reputation, status, and emotional health: 
Ronson’s (2016) monograph on online shaming attests to the serious emotional and life 
consequences that contentious online encounters can have.  
Prior research suggests that morally courageous action is not affected by the presence 
of bystanders per se (Fischer et al., 2006) but that anger (Greitemeyer et al., 2006) and 
situational pro-social norms (see Osswald et al., 2010) foster moral courage. Our approach 
complements these insights to suggest that that both one’s own anger (Study 2), as well as the 
perceived anger of those co-present (i.e., an anger or outrage norm; Thomas & McGarty, 
2009; Studies 1-3) also shapes confrontation because, in the context of disparagement humor, 
it allows the situation to be perceived as necessitating (potentially costly) confrontation. 
Thus, it is not the presence or absence of bystanders per se that matters (Fischer et al., 2006): 
rather, the substantive reactions of those bystanders have the potential to shape responses to 
the situation through processes of (emotion-based) social influence (see also Levine & 
Crowther, 2008). The finding that confrontation was more intense when one’s personal anger 
was matched by the anger of other bystanders (Study 2) suggests a role of anger at both the 
individual and group level, indicating that moral confrontation is driven by both intra-
personal moral judgements (feelings of anger), as well as social context. Thus, although anger 
may be linked with aggression and/or seen as an undesirable expressive emotion 
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(Deffenbacher, Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996) in some contexts it is a critical pro-social, 
moral, emotion (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009b).     
Indeed, our findings here concur with those in the literature on collective action more 
generally (that is, the literature on when people will act as members of groups to challenge 
inequalities): people need to perceive collective support for their worldviews in order to 
develop the commitment to act (van Zomeren et al., 2004; Smith, Thomas, & McGarty, 2015; 
Thomas et al., 2009). In situations where the inequality or injustice is clear to see, this 
support comprises an important part of emotion-focused coping around injustice (van 
Zomeren et al., 2012). However, in situations where the inequality is itself not recognized or 
is contested, bystander responses – those co-present at the moment when the inequality is 
raised and discussed – may be more important still. A denial of inequality is one of the core 
markers of modern sexism (e.g., Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) and racism (e.g., 
McConahay, 1986): people often reject that discrimination exists at all. It is likely that 
bystander responses – online and offline – play an important role in shaping perceptions of 
inequality as a precondition to resistance more broadly (see also Leach & Livingstone, 2015). 
Thus, although confrontation is often conceived of as interpersonal in nature (e.g., Hyers, 
2010), it is nevertheless shaped by group processes.   
It is notable that in Study 1 in particular even a small number of angry comments (4 
of 22) that were presented in the ‘humor’ condition produced weaker forms of confrontation 
(see also Asch, 1956). That is, even a small dissenting minority created fertile ground for an 
alternative construction of the remark (Moscovici et al., 1969). It is also possible that the 
different emotions (humor/anger) delineated an emotion-based intergroup context, in which 
people had to decide who they stand “with” (social categorization) and “against” (see Kessler 
& Hollbach, 2005; Livingstone et al., 2011, 2016). Emotions provide powerful markers of 
intergroup relations; exploring the ways that people can form common cause to resist 
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injustice through processes of emotion-based social influence is a critical direction for future 
research (see also Thomas et al., 2009b). Finally, there also seems to be an inherent tension 
between, on the one hand, encouraging online confrontation of disparagement as a 
normatively ‘good’ or worthwhile method for contesting everyday prejudice; and, on the 
other, the promotion of online shaming – whereby the online confrontational response 
becomes disproportionate to the initial injury.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
Experimental tests of actual bystander confrontation are rare (Nelson et al., 2011). 
Our approach developed an experimental method that was rich in mundane realism and 
germane to understanding the “everyday” ways in which people come to act as moral agents 
to perceive disparagement as prejudice necessitating confrontation. Nevertheless, our 
approach entails a number of complexities and limitations that should be acknowledged. 
First, given the behavioral nature of the paradigm, and that several of the focal variables were 
relatively infrequent and categorical, the effects were not observed consistently across all 
measures (occurrence, intensity) in each of the studies. Second, in our paradigm, participants 
may or may not have felt that they were addressing the perpetrator directly. That is, as in 
most online interactions and other instances of moral confrontation more generally, the 
intended audience of the confrontation in this case was not only the creator of the disparaging 
content (the perpetrator) but also an audience of past and future consumers of that content – 
some of whom corroborated the content and are therefore, in Condor’s (2006) terms, 
accomplices to the act. It will be important for future research to disentangle the effects of 
confrontation directed at perpetrators (as considered by Czopp et al., 2003; Czopp et al., 
2006) or as a tactic to influence the positions of other bystanders (see Postmes & Brunsting, 
2002, for a discussion of the distinction between confrontational versus conversionary forms 
of action).  
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Moreover, thirdly, participants in our paradigm had no reason to expect further or on-
going interactions with other users of the site. Although people do appear to invest 
emotionally in their online commentary, this experimental setting may have been experienced 
as rather less risky than would be the case in everyday online interactions. Since social costs 
are central to definitions of moral courage, future research should directly measure and/or 
manipulate the perceived risks of online confrontation to assess whether these qualify effects 
on emotion-based influence (or not). Finally, as described above, findings from Study 1 
suggest that the ‘amusement’ condition was, in effect, an anger minority condition. As such, 
these studies constitute a conservative test of hypotheses and effects may be stronger still 
where there was unanimous support amongst bystanders for humorous or angry responses 
(e.g., as may be the case with online ‘echo chambers’, e.g., Barbera, Jost, Nagler, Tucker & 
Bonneau, 2015; or viral outrage, Sawaoka & Monin, 2018).  
 The current findings also raise a number of more general suggestions for future 
research. First, the theorizing presented above suggests that bystander responses may be 
particularly important in the context of disparagement humor (as opposed to blatant 
disparagement) because of its inherent ambiguity (Ford et al., 2008; Ford et al., 2017). Any 
disambiguating effect of bystander action may be operating in parallel, or interaction, with 
the emotion-based social influence process articulated here. Research shows that norms may 
be particularly powerful sources of social influence when the stimuli generate uncertainty 
(Sherif, 1935; Latane & Darley, 1968) but also when there is subjective disagreement in 
judgements about that stimuli (e.g, McGarty et al., 1993). Future research might directly test 
the disambiguating effects of bystander commentary via use of experimental manipulations 
which inform bystanders about the pernicious effects of disparagement humour and therefore 
reduce uncertainty about the appropriate response; and/or use of covert psychophysiological 
measures of arousal as a proxy for uncertainty in-situ (e.g., galvanic skin response; Epstein & 
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Roupenian, 1970). Finally, future research may also investigate the processes identified here 
using archival data sourced from social networking services to reveal online confrontation in-
situ.  
Concluding Comments 
There is increasing recognition that the very essence of prejudice can, itself, be 
contested (e.g., Condor, 2006). As Durrheim et al. (2016, p.18) argue: 
it [prejudice] may be contested precisely because group members want to shape social 
actions, events, and definitions of reality, to encourage alignments with and against 
particular causes, influence our treatment of others, and impel social movements of 
various kinds. 
Few would agree that prejudice is a laughing matter; applying the reverse logic, it follows 
that a disparaging remark cannot reasonably be construed as prejudice (necessitating morally 
courageous confrontation), if we are laughing. The results reported here demonstrate that the 
same clip may be evaluated very differently depending on the normative climate in which it 
is presented (see also Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, & Malinen, 2015). Far from being minor 
definitional or conceptual points, these issues are core to social psychological attempts to 
grapple with the contested nature of intergroup relations, moral courage, and collective 
efforts to challenge inequality.   
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Footnotes 
1 We adopt the term ‘social influence’ rather than ‘normative influence’ throughout to refer to 
the impact of knowing what co-present others feel about the stimuli (following Turner, 1991). 
2 Note that, by default, the PROCESS effect coding was reversed such that anger condition was 
coded (-1) relative to the amused (1) and control (1) conditions. However, given that it is more 
intuitive to examine effects of anger (coded 1) relative to the other two conditions, we reversed 
the signs in our reporting of the results for ease of interpretation (Study 2 and Study 3).  
3 A small negative predicted score of -.06 was truncated to zero in Figure 3a, to reflect the 
practical range of the intensity scale, where zero means no action. 
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Table 1. Means and proportions for key variables, by condition (Study 1).  
Note. The values for thumbs down and comment (confrontational/collaborative) variables 
represents the proportion of people (percentage) selecting ‘thumbs down’ or for whom a 
confrontational/collaborative response was recorded, with the number of people who did so (n) 
in brackets. Super-scripts represent values where means/proportions differ at p < .05. 
  
Outcome variables No bystander 
response control  
(n = 30) 
Angry bystander 
response  
(n = 30) 
Amused bystander 
response  
(n = 29) 
Behavioral measures 
Thumbs down 56% (17) a  73% (22) a 58% (17)  a 
Star ratings 3.90 (2.77) a 2.17 (1.90) b 3.90 (2.65) a 
Occurrence of 
confrontational comment  
16% (5) a 43% (13) b 41% (12) b 
Intensity of  
confrontational comment 
0.27 (.69) a 0.93 (1.23) b 0.79 (1.15) b 
Occurrence of 
collaborative comment 
43% (13) a 30% (9) a 41% (12) a 
Intensity of  
collaborative comment 
0.77 (1.04) a 0.50 (.90) a 0.76 (1.09) a 
Self-reported measures 
Enjoyment  3.80 (1.87) a 3.12 (1.80) a 3.64 (1.99) a 
Appropriateness of user 
comments 
4.15 (.49) a 5.03 (1.39) b 4.14 (1.22) a 
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Table 2. Means (standard deviations) for key variables, by experimental condition (Study 2). 
Note. Super-scripts represent values where means or proportions differ at p < .05. 
  
 
Outcome variables No bystander 
response control  
(n = 68) 
Angry bystander 
response  
(n = 71) 
Amused bystander 
response  
(n = 63) 
Behavioral measures 
Thumbs down 33% (22) a  44% (31) b 23% (15) a 
Occurrence of 
confrontational comment  
13% (5) a 17% (12) a 8% (6) a 
Intensity of  
confrontational comment 
0.25 (0.70) a 0.31 (0.79) a 0.12 (0.41) a 
Occurrence of 
collaborative comment 
62% (42) a 49% (34) b 70% (48) a 
Intensity of  
collaborative comment 
1.38 (1.23) a 0.93 (1.12) b 1.46 (1.10) a 
Self-reported measures 
Enjoyment  4.45 (2.04) a 4.07 (1.93) a 4.81 (1.82) a 
Appropriateness of user 
comments 
4.38 (0.99) a 4.13 (1.33) b 4.62 (1.16) a 
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Table 3. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) [95% confidence intervals] for test of effect of angry bystander reaction relative 
to control (effect 1) or bystander amusement (effect 2) on key outcome variables, qualified by own levels of anger and amusement (Study 2).  
Outcome measures Effect 1  
(angry =1  
control =-1) 
Effect 2 
(angry = 1,  
amusement =-1) 
Effect of own 
anger 
Effect of own 
amusement 
Interaction 
between    
effect 1 and 
own anger 
Interaction 
between     
effect 2 and 
own anger 
Interaction 
between      
effect 1 and own 
amusement 
Interaction 
between       
effect 2 and  
own amusement 
Behavioral measures 
Thumbs up (1)/ 
Thumbs down (-1) 




-0.13 (.34)  
[-0.79, 0.53] 
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Appropriateness of 
user comments 
















Note. *** denotes significant at p < .001, ** denotes significant at p < .01, * denotes significant at p < .05, Ϯ denotes p ≤ .07. Analyses for thumbs 
up/down and occurrence of confrontational/collaborative comment are based on logistic regression.  
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Table 4. Means and proportions for key variables, by condition (Study 3). 
Outcome variables No bystander 
response control / 
Non-humorous 
clip 
(n = 34) 
Angry bystander 
response /   
Non-humorous 
clip 
(n = 36) 
Amused 
bystander 
response /   
Non-humorous 
clip 
(n = 35) 
No bystander 
response control / 
Humorous clip 
(n = 39) 
Angry bystander 
response /  
Humorous clip 
(n = 28) 
Amused 
bystander 
response /  
Humorous clip 
(n = 39) 
Behavioral measures 
Thumbs down 90% (28)a 
 
91% (31) a 
 
73% (24) a 
 
36% (14) b 
 
26% (7) b 
 





3% (1) a 17% (6) b 3% (1) a 13% (5) a 21% (6) b 10% (4) a 
Intensity of  
confrontational 
comment 
0.03 (0.17) a 0.42 (0.97) b 0.09 (0.51) a 0.26 (0.75) a 0.46 (0.96) b 0.15 (0.49) a 
Occurrence of 
collaborative comment 
6% (2) a 8% (3) a 14% (5) a 59% (23) b 54% (15) b 79% (31) c 
Intensity of  
collaborative comment 
0.12 (0.48) a 0.19 (0.71) b 0.29 (0.75) a 1.18 (1.14) c 1.11 (1.20) d 1.74 (1.04) c 
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Self-reported measures 
Enjoyment  1.88 (1.23) a 2.29 (1.49) a 2.78 (1.93) b 
 




4.96 (1.74) d 
 
Appropriateness of user 
comments 
4.16 (0.50)a 4.84 (1.12) c 
 
4.18 (1.40) a 
 
4.69 (0.94) b 
 




Note. The values for thumbs down and comment (confrontational/collaborative) variables represents the proportion of people (percentage) 
selecting ‘thumbs down’ or for whom a confrontational/collaborative response was recorded, with the number of people who did so (n) in brackets.  
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Table 5. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) [95% confidence intervals] for test of effect of angry bystander reaction relative 
to control (effect 1) or bystander amusement (effect 2) on key outcome variables, qualified by presentation of the remark (humorous/statement) 
(Study 3).  
Outcome measures Effect 1  
(angry =1,          
control =-1) 
Effect 2  
(angry = 1,  
amusement =-1) 
Effect of presentation 
(1 = humor, -1 = non-
humor) 
Interaction between    
effect 1 and 
presentation 
Interaction between     
effect 2 and 
presentation 
Behavioural measures 
Thumbs up (1)/ 




























































0.03 (.09)  
[-0.15, 0.21] 




























Note. *** denotes significant at p < .001, ** denotes significant at p < .01, * denotes significant at p ≤ .05, Ϯ denotes p ≤ .08. Analyses for thumbs 
up/down and the occurrence of a confrontational/collaborative comments are based on logistic regression. 
 






Figure 1. User interface for the shared media paradigm (angry bystander condition). 
Ratings (3/10) and Thumbs Down (16) denote dislike; viewer comments capture bystander 
appraisals of anger (top left provided a snapshot, full ‘bystander’ comments were viewed 
when the participant scrolled down). Participants indicated their own ratings (stars, thumbs 
up/down), could report the content as inappropriate, and left a comment.  
 










Figure 2. The effect of bystander reactions on ratings is qualified by levels of anger 















Figure 3. The effect of bystander responses on intensity of confrontation is qualified 
by own emotional responses (Study 2).  
  









Figure 4. The effect of bystander responses on the occurrence of collaboration is 
qualified by levels of anger (Study 2).  
  




Figure 5. The effect of bystander responses on the intensity of collaboration is 
qualified by whether the clip was presented in a humorous/non-humorous form (Study 3). 
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Supplementary Materials 
In addition to the focal variables (reported in the main analysis), in Studies 1-3 we 
took additional measures of: the degree to which participants identified with other users of 
the site, prejudice towards gay people (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), social dominance 
orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994), the importance of confronting 
(Rasinski, Geers & Czopp, 2013) and humor style (Thorson & Powell, 1993). The tables 
below describe the key findings on these variables across all studies, using the identical 
analytical approach to that described in the main analysis. We also provide additional figures 
which were not contained in the primary manuscript due to space considerations.  
Study 1 
Table S1. Means (standard deviations) for supplementary variables, by condition (Study 1).  
Outcome variables No bystander 
response control  
(n = 30) 
Angry bystander 
response  
(n = 30) 
Amused bystander 
response  
(n = 29) 
Identification with other 
users 
3.93 (1.16)a 3.83 (1.32)a 3.91 (1.00)a 
Prejudice towards gay 
people 
2.53 (1.26)a 2.00 (1.00)a 2.51 (1.14)a 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.53 (1.25)a 2.60 (1.03)a 2.53 (1.16)a 
Importance of 
confronting 
4.62 (.97)a 4.91 (1.15)a 5.09 (1.23)a 
Humor style 5.31 (.78)a 5.70 (.55)a 5.39 (.98)a 
Note. Super-scripts represent values where means differ at p < .05. 
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Study 2 
Figures S1-S2 display the interactions between the bystander response and own 
amusement on self-reported enjoyment (Figure S1) and appropriateness of bystander 
commentary (Figure S2).  
 
 
Figure S1. The effect of bystander reactions on self-reported enjoyment is qualified by 
levels of amusement (Study 2).  
  




Figure S2. The effect of bystander reactions on appropriateness of bystander 
commentary is qualified by levels of amusement (Study 2).  
During the review process it was suggested that we conduct a comparison between the 
amused and control conditions and include this in the supplementary results for 
completeness. Table S2 displays the results for the test of the difference between the amused 
bystander and control conditions (effect 2) on the key outcome variables, controlling also for 
the difference between the anger and control conditions (effect 1). We focus our discussion 
here (in the supplementary section) on the findings in relation to the comparison between 
amusement and control, and interaction terms.  
Table S2 shows that an amused bystander response (relative to control; effect 2) was 
associated with greater proportion of thumbs up ratings, and amused commentary was also 
seen as more appropriate (relative to no commentary). There were three significant 
interactions between effect 2 and one’s own anger on the intensity of confrontation, 
occurrence of collaboration and perceived appropriateness of bystander commentary; and one 
significant interaction between effect 2 and own amusement on the appropriateness of 
bystander commentary. These can be summarised as follows: 
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• When anger was low, b = 0.10, p = .14, or average levels, b = -0.08, p = .40, the 
manipulation did not affect the intensity of confrontation; when one was high in 
anger, exposure to amused commentary (relative to no commentary) reduced the 
intensity of confrontation, b = -0.26, p = .004.  
• When one is high in anger, participants were more likely to collaborate in the amused 
condition (than the control condition), b = 1.04, p = .03, but there were no differences 
between conditions at average (p = .80) or low levels of anger (p = .39).  
• When one is low, b = 0.50, p = .001, or average in anger, b = 0.39, p = .001 the 
bystander respondents in the amused condition seem more appropriate. However,  
when one is high in anger, there was no difference in the perceived appropriateness of 
bystander responses in the amused and control conditions. The interaction between 
effect 2 and own amusement expresses a similar pattern: when one is low in 
amusement, there were no differences between conditions (p = .78), however, when 
one is at average, b = 0.39, p = .001, or high levels of amusement, b = 0.60, p = .001, 
then the amused bystander response is seen as more appropriate.  
Table S3 displays the means (standard deviations) for the supplementary variables, by 
condition, whilst Table S4 reports the results of the test of the effect of the bystander 
manipulation (effect 1 and effect 2) by own emotion (anger and amusement) for the 
supplementary variables.  
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Table S2. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) for test of effect of amused bystanders relative to control (effect 2) on key 
variables, qualified by own levels of anger and amusement (Study 2).  
Outcome measures Effect 1  
(anger =1  
control =-1) 
Effect 2  
(amused = 1,  
control = -1) 
Effect of own 
anger 
Effect of own 
amusement 
Interaction 
between    
effect 1 and 
own anger 
Interaction 
between     
effect 2 and 
own anger 
Interaction 
between      
effect 1 and own 
amusement 
Interaction 
between       
effect 2 and  
own amusement 
Behavioral measures 
Thumbs up (1)/ 
Thumbs down (-1) 
















-0.27 (.10) ** 0.13 (.10) -0.13 (.09) 0.55 (.06) *** -0.08 (.12) 0.17 (.13) -0.10 (.09) 0.06 (.09) 
Self-report measures 
Enjoyment  -0.21 (.14) 0.24 (.14) -0.33 (.13) * 1.04 (.09) *** 0.05 (.18) -0.20 (.19) 0.21 (.13) 0.08 (.13) 




-0.27 (.11) * 0.26 (.11) * -0.15 (.10) -0.10 (.07) 0.31 (.14) * -0.21 (.15) * -0.33 (.10) ** 0.22 (.10) * 
Note. *** denotes significant at p < .001, ** denotes significant at p < .01, * denotes significant at p < .05. Analyses for thumbs up/down and 
occurrence of confrontational/collaborative comment are based on logistic regression 
 
.
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Table S3. Means (standard deviations) for supplementary variables, by experimental condition 
(Study 2).  
Outcome variables No bystander 
response control  
(n = 73) 
Angry bystander 
response  
(n = 76) 
Amused bystander 
response  
(n = 69) 
Identification with other 
users 
3.56 (1.56)a 3.30 (1.56) a 3.62 (1.47) a 
Identification as anti-
prejudice 
5.01 (1.31) a 4.95 (1.45) a 4.89 (1.50) a 
Prejudice towards gay 
people 
2.93 (1.52) a 2.74 (1.47) a 2.97 (1.72) a 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.74 (1.23) a 2.59 (1.07) a 2.55 (1.16) a  
Importance of 
confronting 
4.84 (1.06) a 4.84 (1.10) a 4.67 (1.23) a 
Humor style 5.13 (1.13) a 5.16 (0.79) a 5.30 (0.99) a 
Political correctness 3.74 (1.57) a 3.62 (1.75) a 3.61 (1.82) a 
Note. Super-scripts represent values where means differ at p < .05. 
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Table S4. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) for test of effect of angry bystander reaction relative to control (effect 1) or 
bystander amusement (effect 2) on supplementary variables, qualified by own levels of anger and amusement (Study 2).  
Outcome measures Effect 1  
(angry =1 v 
control =-1) 
Effect 2 
(angry = 1,  
amusement =-1) 
Effect of own 
anger 
Effect of own 
amusement 
Interaction 
between    
effect 1 and 
own anger 
Interaction 
between     
effect 2 and 
own anger 
Interaction 
between      
effect 1 and own 
amusement 
Interaction 
between       




-0.05 (.14) -0.15 (.14) 0.41 (.13)*** 0.39 (.09)*** 0.16 (.18) -0.04 (.19) -0.15 (.13) -0.10 (.13) 
Identification as 
anti-prejudice 
-0.06 (.13) 0.20 (.14) 0.08 (.12) 0.18 (.09)* -0.12 (.18) 0.03 (.18) 0.17 (.13) -0.08 (.13) 
Prejudice towards 
gay people 
-0.03 (.15) -0.27 (.15) 0.10 (.13) -0.11 (.10) 0.02 (.19) 0.19 (.20) -0.14 (.14) 0.02 (.14) 
Social dominance 
orientation 
-0.12 (.12) 0.02 (.12) 0.12 (.11) 0.0002 (.07) 0.15 (.15) -0.07 (.15) 0.01 (.11) -0.02 (.11) 
Importance of 
confronting 
-0.13 (.11) 0.15 (.11) 0.08 (.10) 0.12 (.07) 0.13 (.14) 0.10 (.15) 0.05 (.11) -0.20 (.10)* 
Humor style 0.07 (.10) -0.10 (.10) -0.07 (.09) 0.19 (.06)** 0.06 (.12) 0.02 (.13) 0.07 (.09) -0.11 (.09) 
Political 
correctness 
-0.14 (.17) 0.13 (.17) 0.36 (.15)* 0.13 (.11) -0.02 (.22) 0.11 (.22) 0.08 (.16) -0.18 (.15) 
Note.. *** denotes significant at p < .001, ** denotes significant at p < .01, * denotes significant at p < .05.  
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Study 3 
During the review process it was suggested that we conduct a third comparison 
between the amused and control conditions and include this in the supplementary results for 
completeness. Table S5 displays the results for the test of the difference between the amused 
bystander and control conditions (effect 2) on the key outcome variables, controlling also for 
the difference between the anger and control conditions (effect 1). We focus our discussion 
here (in the supplementary section) on the findings in relation to the comparison between 
amusement and control, and interaction terms.  
Table S5 shows that an amused bystander response (relative to control; effect 2) was 
associated with greater proportion of thumbs up ratings, self-reported enjoyment, and amused 
commentary also lead to greater occurrence and intensity of collaborative commentary. There 
was one significant interaction between effect 2 and own amusement on the perceived 
appropriateness of bystander commentary. However, neither of the simple slopes were 
significant (p = .16 for the statement clip and p = .11 for the humorous clip).  
Table S6 displays the means (standard deviations) for the supplementary variables and 
Table S7 displays the results of the test of the effect of the bystander manipulation (effect 1 
and effect 2) by presentation of the clip (humor/non-humor) for the supplementary variables.  
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Table S5. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) for test of effect of amused bystanders relative to control on key outcome 
variables, qualified by presentation of the clip (Study 3).  
Outcome measures Effect 1  
(angry =1,          
control =-1) 
Effect 2  
(amusement =1,    
control = -1) 
Effect of presentation 
(1 = humor, -1 = non-
humor) 
Interaction between    
effect 1 and 
presentation 
Interaction between     
effect 2 and 
presentation 
Behavioural measures 
Thumbs up (1)/ 
Thumbs down (-1) 
















-0.13 (.09) 0.25 (.09) ** 0.57 (.06) *** -0.13 (.09) 0.15 (.09) 
Self-reported measures 
Enjoyment  -0.08 (.18) 0.46 (.18) * 1.09 (.12) *** -0.05 (.18) -0.02 (.18) 




0.13 (.11) 0.01 (.11) 0.17 (.08) * -0.32 (.11) ** 0.24 (.11) * 
Note. *** denotes significant at p < .001, ** denotes significant at p < .01, * denotes significant at p < .05. Analyses for thumbs up/down and 
occurrence of confrontational/collaborative comment are based on logistic regression.  
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Table S6. Means (standard deviations) for supplementary variables, by condition (Study 3).  
Outcome variables No bystander 
response control / 
Non-humorous 
clip 









(n = 35) 
No bystander 
response control / 
Humorous clip 
(n = 39) 
Angry bystander 
response /  
Humorous clip 
(n = 28) 
Amused 
bystander 
response /  
Humorous clip 
(n = 39) 
Identification with other 
users 
4.01 (1.35)a 3.52 (1.57) a 3.43 (1.61) a 3.72 (1.43) a 3.83 (1.31) a 3.62 (1.49) a 
Identification as anti-
prejudice 
4.70 (1.69) a 4.67 (1.64) a 5.41 (1.44) b 5.31 (1.22) b 4.73 (1.63) a 4.63 (1.50) a 
Prejudice towards gay 
people 
3.06 (1.65) a 3.16 (1.66) a 2.32 (1.23) a 2.53 (1.50) a 2.96 (1.66) a 3.41 (1.77) a 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.39 (1.09) a 2.72 (1.43) b 2.10 (.96) a 1.91 (1.22) a 2.68 (1.12) b 2.40 (1.25) a 
Importance of 
confronting 
4.79 (1.23) a 4.67 (1.18) a 5.06 (1.07) a 4.96 (1.07) a 4.82 (1.12) a 4.15 (1.12) a 
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Humor style 5.30 (.91) a 5.24 (.99) a 5.45 (.71) a 5.20 (.64) a 5.29 (1.12) a 5.07 (1.03) a 
Political correctness 4.79 (1.35) a 4.51 (1.20) a 4.99 (1.36) a 5.18 (1.35) a 4.83 (1.37) a 4.45 (1.27) a 
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Table S7. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) for test of effect of angry bystander reaction relative to control (effect 1) or 
bystander amusement (effect 2) on supplementary variables, qualified by presentation of the remark (humorous/statement) (Study 3).  
Outcome measures Effect 1  
(angry =1,          
control =-1) 
Effect 2  
(angry = 1,  
amusement =-1) 
Effect of presentation 
(1 = humor, -1 = non-
humor) 
Interaction between    
effect 1 and 
presentation 
Interaction between     
















-0.17 (.15) 0.01 (.15) -0.01  -0.29* 0.32* 
Prejudice towards 
gay people 
0.20 (.15) -0.10 (.15) 0.05 (.11) 0.28 (.15) -0.42 (.15)** 
Social dominance 
orientation 
0.25 (.12)* 0.05 (.12) -0.04 (.08) 0.19 (.12) -0.16 (.12) 
Importance of 
confronting 
0.16 (.11) 0.18 (.11) -0.10 (.08) -0.17 (.11) 0.34 (.11)** 
Humor style 0.007 (.09) -0.007 (.09) -0.06 (.07) -0.01 (.09) 0.10 (.09) 
Political 
correctness 
-0.25 (.13)  0.16 (.13) 0.03 (.09) -0.14 (.13) 0.26 (.13)* 
Note. *** denotes significant at p < .001, ** denotes significant at p < .01, * denotes significant at p ≤ .05. Analyses for thumbs up/down and the 
occurrence of a confrontational/collaborative comments are based on logistic regression. 
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Study 4: Bogus pipeline study 
 In addition to the studies reported in the manuscript we conducted an additional study 
in which we attempt an experimental manipulation of individual anger and amusement prior 
to the bystander (social appraisal) manipulation of anger and amusement. Specifically, we 
used an adaptation of the bogus pipeline technique (see Jones & Sigall, 1971) to 
experimentally manipulate individual, personal emotional reactions of anger and amusement.  
Method 
Design and participants. The study was conducted in the laboratory. Upon arrival 
participants were randomly allocated to one of four experimental conditions comprising a 2 
(individual emotion: anger/amusement) x 2 (bystander emotion: anger/amusement) between 
persons design. Participants (N = 121) were university students or persons recruited on the 
campus of an Australian university. They were renumerated with course credit or AUD$10. 
Participants were primarily female (76%) with an average age of 27 (SD = 10.82).  
Procedure. The participants were greeted by an experimental assistant and were 
given the same cover story as in Studies 1-3. In addition, they were told that we were going to 
use a galvanic skin response to record their implicit/automatic emotional responses to the 
clip. Electrodes were placed on the hands of participants and an experimental assistant sat on 
the other side of a partition to ostensibly administer the psychophysiological measure, but 
whilst maintaining the anonymous responding of participants.  
As in Study 1, participants first watched a filler clip before watching the target 
disparagement clip. Having finished the clip, participants were presented with a graphic that 
suggested that the computer was calculating their response. They were then given the bogus 
feedback that they had either registered an “angry” response or an “amused” response. 
Participants then went on to view the content of the other users. As in Study 1, those 
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comments either reflected amusement (bystander amusement condition) or anger (bystander 
anger condition). Participants left their own ratings and comments on the Wordpress site and 
were then sent to an online survey (Survey Select) to complete other measures of self-
reported enjoyment, anger/amusement, appropriateness of comments and supplementary 
measures.   
Unfortunately, significant technical problems occurred throughout the study. 
Specifically: the webpages that we were using had problems loading, necessitating frequent 
intervention from the experimental assistant. These problems may have obscured the effects 
of the independent variables.     
Results 
Manipulation checks.  Measures of individual emotions revealed that the bogus 
pipeline procedure did not appear to affect self-reported emotional states (“I found the clip 
outrageous [amusing]”). The differences in anger were not reliable, F (1, 119) = 2.89, p = .09, 
η2p = .025, and neither were the differences in amusement, F (1, 119) = .08, p = .78, η
2
p = 
.001. However, as in Studies 1-3, the bystander manipulation was effective. Those in the 
‘angry’ bystander condition reported that bystanders found the clip more outrageous (M = 
5.50, SE = .19), than those in the ‘amused’ bystander condition (M = 4.36, SE = .19), F (1, 
119) = 18.05, p < .001, η2p = .14. Conversely, those in the ‘amused’ bystander condition 
reported that bystanders found the clip more amusing (M = 4.42, SE = .18) than those in the 
‘angry’ condition (M = 4.42, SE = .18), F (1, 119) = 61.06, p < .001, η2p = .35. 
Main analysis. Table S8 displays the means and standard deviations for the 
behavioral measures, self-reported measures and supplementary measures. We used 
PROCESS (Model 1) to test the direct and interactive effects of the manipulations on the 
outcomes. The super-scripts denote where means were different (p < .05) It can be seen that 
there was a main effect of individual anger on the rating, b = -.46, SE = .22, p = .04. There 
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was also a main effect of bystander emotion on the perceived appropriateness of those 
responses such that angry responses were seen as more appropriate than amused responses, b 
= .24, SE = .12, p = .05, but this was qualified by a significant interaction, b = .25, SE = .12, p 
= .05. Simple slopes revealed that bystander comments were judged to be more appropriate 
when the individual was told that they were angry, and they were also exposed to the anger of 
other bystanders, b = .49, SE = .18, p = .006, but not when the bystanders were told that they 
were personally amused, b = -.007, SE = .18, p = .97. This provides converging support for 
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(n = 30) 
Own amusement / 
bystander anger 
(n = 29) 
Own amusement / 
bystander amusement 
(n = 30) 
Own anger/ bystander 
amusement  
(n = 29) 
Behavioral measures  
Star ratings 2.63 (1.82) a 3.32 (2.50) b 3.92 (2.50) a 2.96 (2.37) b 
Occurrence of 
confrontational comment  
36% (11) a 38% (11) a 28% (9) a 59% (17) a 
Intensity of  
confrontational comment 
.66 (1.04) a .93 (1.31) a .66 (1.11) a 1.04 (1.07) a 
Occurrence of 
collaborative comment 
39% (212) a 35% (10) a 53% (17) a 41% (12) a 
Intensity of  
collaborative comment 
.69 (1.00) a .59 (.95) a 1.00 (1.10) a .75 (1.00) a 
Self-reported measures  
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Enjoyment  2.89 (1.65) a 2.83 (1.88) a 3.53 (1.95) a 3.28 (2.04) a 
Appropriateness of user 
comments 
5.16 (1.34) a 4.86 (1.33) b 4.88 (1.39) c 4.18 (1.36) c 
Supplementary measures 
Identification with other 
users 
4.24 (.91) a 3.98 (1.25) a 4.22 (1.14) a 3.85 (1.16) a 
Identification as anti-
prejudice 
4.98 (1.22) a 5.18 (1.46) a 5.24 (1.36) a 5.01 (1.50) a 
Prejudice towards gay 
people 
2.95 (1.22) a 2.29 (1.11) b 2.54 (1.05) b 2.84 (1.41) a 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.19 (.77) a 2.04 (.79) a 2.19 (.90) a 2.61 (1.13) a 
Importance of 
confronting 
5.11 (1.03) a 5.25 (.90) a 5.40 (.77) a 5.25 (.75) a 
Humor style 5.22 (.94) a 5.26 (.84) a 5.19 (.96) a 5.31 (.60) a 
Political correctness 4.93 (.98) a 4.66 (.97) a 5.09 (.92) a 4.72 (.87) a 
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